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Abstract—Constraints in fuel supply, electricity generation and 
transmission interact to affect the welfare of strategic generators 
and  price-sensitive  consumers.  We  consider  a  mixed  integer 
bilevel programming model in which the leader makes capacity 
expansion decisions in the fuel transportation, generation, and 
transmission infrastructure of the electricity supply network to 
maximize social welfare less investment cost. Based on the leader's 
expansion decisions, the multiple followers including the fuel 
suppliers, ISO and generation companies simultaneously optimize 
their respective objectives of cost, social welfare, and profit. The 
bilevel program is formulated as a mathematical program with 
complementarity constraints. The computational challenge posed 
by the discrete character of transmission expansions has been 
managed by multiple model reformulations. A lower bound 
provided by a nonlinear programming reformulation increases 
the efficiency of solving a binary variable reformulation to global 
optimality. A single-level optimization relaxation serves as a 
competitive benchmark to assess the effect of generator strategic 
operational behavior on the optimal capacity configuration. 
 
Index Terms— Capacity expansion, electricity market model, 
mathematical program with complementarity constraints, mixed 
integer bilevel program 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
e consider an integrated supply network for an electricity 
market including fuel transportation, electricity 
transmission   and   individual   generation   companies.   The 
decision  makers  in  each  level  of  the  supply  network  have 
distinct objectives to optimize. The fuel suppliers, who deliver 
the fuel to the power generation companies, want to minimize 
their fuel transportation cost that includes both the fuel cost and 
fuel delivery cost. The independent system operator (ISO) who 
settles the locational marginal prices (LMPs) and dispatches the 
electricity through the transmission network, aims to maximize 
the total welfare of both the sellers and the buyers of electricity 
in a wholesale market. The individual generation companies, 
who buy the fuel, generate electricity and sell it at the LMPs, 
wish to maximize their profits. All of these decision makers 
optimize simultaneously in the electricity market subject to 
capacity constraints. 
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The overall welfare of market participants could be increased 
by capacity expansions to relieve constraints.  Expansions at 
different levels and locations in the supply network could 
increase the availability of low-cost fuel, enable higher 
utilization of efficient generation resources, and level out the 
LMPs. These decisions are the responsibility of the facility 
owners, who naturally determine capacity investments to 
achieve their own objectives. However, such decentralized 
expansion decisions may not be optimal for the whole 
integrated electricity supply system. In this paper, we examine 
the investment decisions that a leader would make on behalf of 
the overall system, to maximize the total welfare resulting from 
decentralized operational decisions less the total investment 
cost. The results of optimizing from this global perspective 
reveal the interactions among constraints at different levels and 
identify bottlenecks in the integrated supply network. They 
could be used as a target in the development of consistent 
incentives or regulations to encourage the lower level players to 
make individual decisions that more closely approximate the 
global optimum for the overall system. 
Considering both the investment and operational levels of 
decision-making, we propose a mixed integer bilevel 
programming model. The upper level leader decides how to 
expand the capacity of the integrated supply system. Once the 
capacity expansion decisions are made, lower level decision 
makers including the fuel suppliers, the ISO and the generation 
companies simultaneously make their optimal operating 
decisions to realize their respective objectives. Thus, this model 
falls between a fully centralized setting, in which a single entity 
makes both investment and operational decisions, and a fully 
decentralized setting, where multiple entities make decisions at 
both levels.   The fully centralized version is included as a 
special case (1-level MIQP; see Section III.B). We set up a 
simple two-period model in which capacity investments are 
made in the first period based on equivalent hourly costs, and 
the system is operated in the second period, which represents a 
typical hour in a future scenario. The model could be elaborated 
to account for sequential expansions over time and/or multiple 
future scenarios of demand, fuel costs, and other uncertain 
conditions. 
Given the capacity decisions in the integrated supply 
network,  the  simultaneous  optimization  of  the  lower  level 
sub-problems, which mutually interact, leads to an equilibrium 
problem. It has been thoroughly studied and solved as a mixed 
complementarity problem (MCP) [1] and validated by 
comparison with a computational agent simulation [2]. In the 
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Decision 
Variable Description 
 
Upper 
Level 
nU Fuel transport capacities after expansion 
nV Generation capacities after expansion 
z Binary decision variables for new transmission lines 
 
 
Lower 
Level 
x Fuel delivered at fuel transportation arcs 
q Demand satisfied at electricity nodes 
θ Voltage angles at electricity nodes 
f Electricity flows on transmission lines 
y Generation amounts at electricity nodes 
η (Scalar) price at the reference electricity node 
 
 
 
restructured wholesale electricity market, the prices submitted 
by the generator companies are determined according to their 
marginal costs, which depend mostly on the fuel costs [3]. Here 
we assume that the fuel suppliers, represented for simplicity by 
a single fictional fuel dispatcher, decide the quantities of the 
fuel shipped over various routes to minimize the cost of 
satisfying demands of all of the generator companies. The ISO 
manages the electricity wholesale market where the buyer 
(inverse) demand functions are linear functions of the LMPs, 
and makes the electricity dispatch decision. The individual 
generation companies, considered as Cournot competitors, pay 
attention to the price differentials among the electricity nodes 
and determine their electricity quantities to sell under a type of 
bounded rationality [4]. 
In  general,  mixed integer bilevel programming (MIBLP) 
problems are hard to solve. Moore and Bard [5] presented the 
challenge of the MIBLP problem and proposed a series of 
heuristics to efficiently find a good feasible solution. DeNegre 
et al. [6] further proposed a branch and cut method to improve 
the branch and bound algorithm in [5]. Colson et al. [7] 
reviewed methodologies and applications of bilevel 
programming problems and described their connections with 
mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPECs). 
The bilevel programming technique was introduced to model 
the integrated system of multiple participants usually with 
different objective functions. Many applications involving 
restructured  electricity  markets  have  formulated  the  ISO 
market clearing problem as the lower level. Hu and Ralph [8] 
modeled a game among the consumers and generators 
submitting the bids to the ISO in the upper level. There are also 
formulations considering the bidding strategy of the generation 
companies in the upper level [9, 10]. Generation or 
transmission expansion decisions by an individual participant 
can also be modeled as the upper level with the lower level 
representing the market outcomes [11, 12].  Including multiple 
decision-makers in the upper level constitutes an equilibrium 
problem with equilibrium constraints, which is much harder to 
solve. 
In our model, the integer variables appear only in the upper 
level. Therefore, the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) optimality 
conditions can still be applied to the lower level problems. 
Upon applying the KKT conditions to all the sub-problems, the 
bilevel problem becomes a mathematical program with 
complementarity constraints (MPCC). The MPCC is a special 
case of MPEC, which has attracted great attention for the past 
decade as more and more engineering and economic 
applications involve equilibrium modeling. Ferris and Pang 
[13] gave a comprehensive summary of the engineering and 
economic applications of MPCC and the available solution 
algorithms. Its solution requires an equivalent reformulation of 
complementarity  constraints  and  global convergence  of  the 
solution can be guaranteed only under certain conditions. Hu et 
al. [14] presented a methodology to find the global optimal 
solution of a linear program with linear complementarity 
constraints by reformulating the constraints with binary 
variables. 
The contributions of this paper are fourfold: (1) We 
investigate a fuel transportation, generation and transmission 
expansion problem of an integrated electricity supply system in 
which an equilibrium in a restructured market is reached by the 
fuel suppliers, generator companies and ISO solving 
simultaneous and interdependent optimization problems. 
Instead of letting each market player make his own expansion 
decision, we find the optimal expansion decision for the whole 
integrated system from the global perspective. (2) We 
incorporated  discrete  transmission  expansion  decisions  by 
using binary variables in the direct current optimal power flow 
constraints. (3) The problem is formulated as a bilevel 
programming problem. The challenge posed by the discrete 
decision variables makes it difficult to achieve global 
optimality.  We  provided  three  problem  reformulations  to 
bound the objective and find a global optimum. (4) The model 
and solution procedure are illustrated by a small case study that 
shows how the global expansion decision affects the LMPs of 
each node in the transmission grid, the buyers’ surplus, the 
sellers’ surplus and the transmission rents. 
 
 
II.  MODEL FORMULATION 
 
We formulate a bilevel capacity expansion problem of an 
integrated electricity supply network, where we also optimize 
the sub-problems of fuel suppliers, generators and the ISO in 
the lower level. 
 
TABLE I 
SETS OF NODES AND ARCS 
Set Description Indices 
N Electricity nodes i, j 
F Fuel supply nodes G 
L Transmission lines ij 
A Fuel supply lines gj 
Ng Set of electricity nodes supplied by fuel supply node g j 
Fj Set of fuel supply nodes supplying the electricity node j g 
 
TABLE II DECISION 
VARIABLES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I indicates the sets of nodes and arcs of the integrated 
electricity supply network. Tables II and III respectively give 
the notation for both decision variables and parameters of the 
model. The variable η is a scalar and all the other variables and 
parameters are vectors. All fuel quantities are expressed in 
MWh equivalents. Appendix A shows how to incorporate heat 
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Parameter Description 
a Intercepts of electricity demand prices as linear functions of quantities 
b Slopes  of  electricity  demand  prices  as  linear  functions  of quantities 
c Costs per MWh-equivalent of fuel transported 
fc Investment cost for fuel transportation network expansion 
gc Investment costs for generation expansion 
tc Investment costs for transmission line expansion 
θmax Maximum values for voltage angles 
θ min Minimum values for voltage angles 
φ  Nodal electricity price premia at electricity nodes 
π Nodal prices for fuel delivered to generators 
V Generation capacities at electricity nodes 
U Capacities of fuel supply arcs 
K Capacities of transmission lines 
W Quantities of fuel available at fuel supply nodes 
B Susceptances of transmission lines 
 
+ 
 
rates and efficiencies of converting fuels to electricity. 
 
TABLE III 
PARAMETERS 
parameters in the generators’ problems. The dual variables φ  
in Eq. (16) of the ISO’s problem are the electricity nodal price 
premium parameters in the generator problems. The electricity 
quantities determined by the generators are the fuel demand 
parameters in the fuel dispatcher’s problem and the electricity 
supply quantities for the ISO’s problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
nU Z 
yi yi 
π  i pi 
 
y j yi 
 
π  i pi 
y j y j 
 
 
 
A.  Mixed Integer Bilevel Program (MIBLP) 
Fig. 1. The Bilevel Program w nter g Lower Level Optimization 
Problems 
The objective function of the upper level is to maximize the Given the generation amount y j   at each electricity node j, 
social welfare including the buyers’ surplus, power producers’ 
surplus and transmission rents, less the investment costs of 
expansions in fuel transportation, transmission network and 
the fuel dispatcher’s optimization problem is: 
 
Fuel Dispatcher’s decision problem 
power  generation  capacities.  We  expand  capacity  of  the 
existing assets for both the fuel network and generation. For the 
min 
x ≥ 0 
∑  
gj∈ A 
cgj xgj (2) 
transmission network, we assume the capacity expansions are
 
s.t.  −
 
x   ≥  −W  ,
 
∀g ∈  F
 
[ω  ≥  0]
 
(3) 
realized by building new lines selected from a set of candidates. 
∑  j∈ N g gj g g 
All investment costs are linear.
 
x   = y ,
 
∀j ∈  N
 
[π  ]
 
(4) ∑  g∈ Fj gj j j 
 
max ⎛ 1 b q 2  + a q  ⎞ −  c  x
 −  xgj  ≥  − nU gj 
, 
∀gj ∈  A [ρ gj  ≥  
0] 
(5) 
nU , nV , z 
∑ ⎜ 2  j     j j     j ⎜ ∑  gj    gj 
j   ⎝ ⎠ gj∈ A xgj  ≥  0 (6) 
−  ∑  fcgj (nU gj  − U gj ) −  ∑  gc j (nV j  −  V 
j ) 
gj∈ A j∈N 
−  ∑ tcij Kij zij 
ij∈ L 
(1)  
The fuel dispatcher aims to minimize the transportation cost 
subject to the constraints of fuel supply capacity (3), electricity 
demand (4) and the fuel transportation arc capacity (5). 
The market operator, ISO, seeks to maximize the social 
The electricity demand at each electricity node is defined as a 
linear function of the nodal price. The intercept and slope of the 
welfare  based  on  the  direct  current  optimal  power  flow 
(DCOPF) model with the full-structured form [16, 17]. Given 
inverse demand function are respectively a j and bj   with bj < the generation amounts y j   at the electricity nodes, the ISO’s 
0 at electricity node j. Fixed (inelastic) demands can also be 
incorporated in the lower level model [15]. 
For the lower level optimization problems, we consider the 
decision problem is: 
 
ISO’s decision problem 
three major players in the electricity supply network consisting  max ⎛ 1 b q 2  + a q  ⎞
  
(7) 
of fuel suppliers, ISO and generators, who all optimize under q ,θ  , f 
∑ ⎜ 2  j     j j     j ⎜ 
j   ⎝ ⎠ 
the  same electricity  market conditions. The fuel dispatcher s.t. q + f   −
 
f  = y , ∀j ∈  N
 
[p ] (8) 
minimizes   the   fuel   transportation   cost   delivered   to   the j     ∑  ji ∑  ij j j i i 
generators;   the   ISO   maximizes   the   social   welfare   of θ   ≤  θ  
max , 
∀j ∈  N [α  +  ≥  
0] 
(9) 
participants  in  the  wholesale  electricity  market;  and  the j j j 
−θ    ≤  −θ  min , ∀j ∈  N [α  −   ≥  0] (10) 
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−  
generators maximize their profits from selling the electricity. j j j 
However, these three different optimization problems 
interact with each other as shown in Fig. 1. The dual variables π 
in Eq. (4) of the fuel dispatcher’s problem are the marginal cost 
fij  −  Bij (θ i  − θ  j ) −  (1 −  zij ) M ij  
≤  0, 
Bij (θ i  − θ  j ) −  fij  −  (1 −  zij ) M ij  
≤  0, 
∀ij ∈  L 
∀ij ∈  L 
[γ  ij   ≥  
0] 
[γ  ij   ≥  
0] 
(11) 
(12) 
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+ 
ij 
 
 
fij  ≤  zij Kij , 
−  fij  ≤  zij Kij , 
∀ij ∈  L 
∀ij ∈  L 
[λ ij   ≥  0] 
(13) 
[λ  −   ≥  0] 
(14) 
marginal cost. This market behavior does not agree with the 
oligopolistic competition that we assumed. The Cournot model 
is not as realistic as the supply function equilibrium model. 
However, it is much easier to solve and in the long run the 
The ISO’s decision problem, based on the full-structured 
DCOPF model of [17], is equivalent to the reduced structure 
DCOPF model in [1]. 
Condition (8) represents the flow balance at each electricity 
node. Constraints (9) and (10) give the bounds on each voltage 
angle. Equations (11) and (12) incorporate the physical 
characteristics of the transmission grid so that the (linearized) 
market behavior is close to Cournot result [19, 20]. Since the 
total amount of electricity generated affects the electricity 
market prices, here we assume that each generator also 
determines the LMP η at the reference electricity node [4]. 
The LMP at the reference electricity node is 
power flow equations will always be satisfied. The maximum 
capacity of each transmission line is enforced by equations (13) 
and (14). 
Instead of the standard power flow equation 
Bij (θ i  − θ  j ) −  fij  = 0 ,  binary  decision  variables  z  and  
large 
η  = pref 
 
and the price premium at each node is then defined as 
 
φ  j  = p j  
− η  
(15) 
 
 
 
 
(16) 
values M are used in (11) and (12) to represent discrete 
investment decisions on new transmission lines in disjunctive 
constraints similar to those in a transmission-switching model 
 
where the LMPs p are dual variables of the energy conservation 
constraints (8). 
Given the fuel price π   and price premium φ   at its node, i i 
[16,  18].  The  variable zij indicates  the  existence  of  the which are derived from the dual variables of the fuel supplier’s 
transmission line ij. If the candidate transmission line has been decision problem and ISO’s decision problem, respectively, the 
added, then zij equals 1, the value of M ij does not matter at all, decision problem of generator i is: 
and the two inequalities are equivalent to the traditional power 
flow equation. On the other hand, if zij is 0, then the value of Generator’s decision problem  
M ij 
 
matters.  The  value  of 
 
M ij 
 
should  be  large  enough  to max
 
yi 
≥ 0,η  
(η  + φ i  −  π i ) 
yi 
(17) 
impose no additional constraint on Bij (θ i  − θ  j ) −  fij . We fixed s.t. y − η
 1 φ  j  −  a j 
= −  y ,  ∀i ∈  N [β  ]
  (18) 
i ∑  ∑  ∑  j i 
all the z variables corresponding to the lines which exist prior to j    bj j bj j ≠ i 
the expansion decision to be 1. For the candidate transmission yi  ≤  nVi , ∀i ∈  N [μ i  ≥  0] (19) 
lines, their corresponding z variables can be either 1 or 0, to 
represent building those lines or not. 
Regarding the parameters M, excessively large values might 
cause numerical difficulties when solving the problem. One of 
yi  ≥  0 
Equation (18) represents ∑  qi 
 
 
= ∑  yi 
(20) 
 
 
, the balance of total 
the assumptions of the DCOPF model is that the voltage angle 
difference of any transmission line is quite small [17]. Here we 
adopt the assumption in [16] with upper and lower bounds on 
θ  of ± 0.6. Because the electricity flow f is also bounded by 
K, 
i i 
demand and total generation in terms of the residual demand 
seen by generator i. Constraint (19) indicates the maximum 
generation capacity. The generator’s problem can also be 
extended to take carbon emission regulations into account, as 
the  quantity Bij (θ i  − θ  j ) −  
fij 
is  bounded  by  1.2Bij  + Kij   , described in Appendix B. 
If we explore only the lower level optimization problems by 
which therefore represents a sufficiently large value of M ij . 
We assume that the electricity wholesale market takes the 
form of oligopolistic competition. The multiple generators are 
modeled as Cournot competitors in the electricity wholesale 
market. Each of them determines its electricity quantity to sell. 
Besides the Cournot model, there are also many other 
approaches available to model the generator competition in the 
electricity market [19]. A more realistic approach is the supply 
function equilibrium game that allows each firm to submit a bid 
function with different quantities offered at different prices. 
However, it suffers from computational inefficiency and 
multiplicity of equilibria due to its non-convexity. Another 
popular approach is a Bertrand game in which the producer 
makes the decision on selling price instead of quantity. 
Therefore it is more likely to give a similar result as in a 
competitive electricity market where the prices are all set to the 
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simply ignoring the upper level objective function, the lower 
level is equivalent to the problem studied by Ryan et al. [1]. The 
only difference is the equivalent modification of the ISO’s 
decision problem to incorporate the transmission expansion 
decision. We verified our equivalent new model with fixed 
capacities by comparing its numerical results with those in [2]. 
Because the existence of a Nash equilibrium has been proved in 
[1], it also holds for our lower level problems. To explore the 
potential multiplicity of equilibria, we solved both the 
maximization and minimization problems for multiple different 
objective functions in the numerical instance of Section IV with 
investment variables fixed, and they all returned with the same 
equilibrium solution, which suggests that the equilibrium is 
unique in that instance. 
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B.  Mathematical Program with Complementarity 
Constraints (MPCC) 
The MPCC problem is to optimize an objective function 
subject to complementarity constraints that can be expressed 
with the standardized format 0 ≤  x ⊥  f ( x ) ≥  0 . 
The MIBLP problem presented in Section II.A has integer 
decision variables only in the upper level. Thus, the lower level 
optimization   problem   can   be   reformulated   in   terms   of 
 
 
 
III.  REFORMULATION AND SOLUTION 
 
A.   Nonlinear Programming Reformulation (MPCC-NLP) 
To solve the MPCC, its complementarity constraints must be 
reformulated. One method is to transform them into nonlinear 
functions. Consider a generic complementarity constraint as: 
complementarity constraints by applying the KKT conditions 
to each player’s optimization problem. This transforms the 
0 ≤  r ⊥  s ≥  
0 
(39) 
original bilevel program into an equivalent MPCC with a 
mixed integer quadratic objective function. The objective 
function is given by equation (1) and the full set of constraints 
is: 
The product reformulation replaces it with constraints that r 
and s are nonnegative and r ′ s = 0 [21]. The 
complementarity 
constraint  can  also  be  expressed  in  terms  of  a  nonlinear 
complementarity   problem   (NCP)   function Φ  (r, s ) that 
0 ≤  xgj  ⊥  cgj  + ω g  − π  j  + ρ gj ≥  0, ∀gj 
∈  A 
 
(21) 
 
satisfies Φ  (r, s ) = 0 
 
if and only if r ′ s = 
0 
 
and r, s ≥  0 . An 
∑  xgj   = y j , ∀j ∈  
N 
g∈ F j 
(22) example of Φ  (r, s ) is the Fischer-Burmeister 
0 ≤  ω g  ⊥  Wg  −  ∑  xgj  ≥  0, ∀g ∈  
F 
(23) function r 
2  + s2  −  r −  s [22,  23].  Both  of  these  methods 
j∈ N g 
0 ≤  ρ gj  ⊥  nUgj  −  xgj  ≥  0, ∀gj ∈  
A 
a j  + bj q j  −  p j  = 0, ∀j ∈  N 
 
 
(24) 
(25) 
maintain  the  reformulated  complementarity  conditions  as 
constraints. A third method is to penalize positive values of the 
reformulated nonlinear function r ′ s in the objective function. 
These three methods are available as options in the NLPEC 
α  −   − α  + + ∑  B (γ  
+  −  γ  −  ) −  ∑  B (γ  
+  −  γ  + ) = 0, ∀j ∈  N  
(26) 
solver in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) 
j j ji ji ji ij ij ij 
i , ji∈ L i ,ij∈ L [24]. For the numerical instance in Section IV, no optimal 
p j  −  pi  −  γ  ij + γ  ij  −  λ ij 
+ λ ij 
= 0, ∀ij ∈  L (27) solutions  were  found  with  either  the  Fischer-Burmeister 
function or the penalty reformulations. Local optimality was 
q j + ∑  f ji  −   ∑  fij   = y j , ∀j ∈  
N 
ji∈ L ij∈ L 
(28) achieved by the product reformulation, which converted the 
0 ≤  θ  max  
− θ  
⊥  α  +  ≥  0, ∀j ∈  
N 
(29) MPCC to a mixed integer nonlinear programming problem. 
j j j However, global optimality of the solution is not guaranteed. 
0 ≤  −θ  min  + 
θ  ⊥  α  
−   ≥  0, ∀j ∈  
N 
(30) We can conclude only that the solution is feasible but not 
j j j 
0 ≤  B  (θ  − θ   ) −  f  + (1 −  z  ) M   ⊥  γ  +  ≥  0, ∀ij ∈  L 
(31) ij i j ij ij ij ij 
0 ≤  − Bij  (θ i  −  θ  j ) + fij  + (1 −  zij ) M ij  ⊥  γ  ij   ≥  0, ∀ij ∈  L 
(32) 
 
+
 
 
necessarily  globally  optimal  for  the  MIBLP  problem.  Its 
objective value is therefore a lower bound on the optimal value. 
To identify the global optimum of the MIBLP problem, we 
further explored two additional methods to solve the problem 
described in sections B and C respectively. 
0 ≤  zij Kij  −  fij  ⊥  λ ij   ≥  0, ∀ij 
∈  L 
(33) 
0 ≤  zij Kij  + fij   ⊥  
λ  j 
≥  0, ∀ij ∈  
L 
(34) B.  Single-Level Mixed Integer Quadratic Program (1-level 
MIQP) 
0 ≤  y j  ⊥  −η  − φ j  + π  j  + β  j  + μ  j  ≥  0, ∀ j ∈  N 
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β  1 
(35)  
The 
MI
BL
P 
mo
del 
ass
um
es 
that 
a 
cent
ral 
deci
sion 
ma
ker 
y j  + ∑  j = 0, ∀j ∈  N (36) anticipates the lower level decision makers’ reactions to his 
i∈ N bi 
0 ≤  μ  j  ⊥  nVj  −  y j  ≥  0, ∀j ∈  
N 
nU gj  ≥  U gj , nV j  ≥  V j , zij  
∈ {0,1} 
 
(37) 
(38) 
investment  decision  on  the  capacity  expansion  of  all  the 
facilities involved and makes the optimal decision to maximize 
the total benefit. All of the lower level decision makers will 
respectively make their optimal operational decisions, given 
the leader’s decision. 
Constraints (21) – (24) are the KKT conditions for the fuel 
dispatcher’s problem (2) – (6), while (25) – (34) are the KKT 
conditions for the ISO’s decision problem (7) – (14), and (35) – 
(38) are the accumulated KKT conditions for all generation 
companies’ problems (17) – (20). 
Due to the non-convexity of the feasible region, the MPCC 
problem is difficult to solve.   In the next section we outline 
three reformulations and describe how they help to identify and 
evaluate the global optimal solution. 
In the 1-level MIQP relaxation, we assume that there is only 
one centralized decision maker in the market making all 
investment and operational decisions to optimize the benefit of 
the whole system, while satisfying all the physical constraints 
from each part of the integrated network. In this case, the 
generator companies are no longer able to make their own 
strategic decision to maximize their profit but simply accept the 
market optimal decisions. 
This relaxed problem can be derived by removing all of the 
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Fuel Suppliers Electricity Nodes 1 2 3 4 5 
 
U g , j (MWh 
equivalent) 
C1 200 30 30 0 0 
C2 800 500 500 0 0 
G1 0 0 0 130 60 
G2 0 0 0 1200 800 
 
cgj 
($/MWh) 
C1 65 73 70 - - 
C2 80 75 72 - - 
G1 - - - 120 115 
G2 - - - 125 122 
 
 
 
objective functions of the lower level optimization problems. 
The objective function of the 1-level MIQP problem is equation 
(1), and the constraints are equations (3) – (6), (8) – (14) and 
(18) – (20). Because the ISO and fuel dispatch objectives are 
already included in (1), only the generator strategic capability is 
removed. Since the problem is a relaxation of the original 
problem, its optimal solution provides an upper bound for the 
MIBLP problem, and therefore can be used to bound the 
optimality gap once a feasible solution is provided. 
The difference of the optimal objective values derived from 
the MPCC-NLP and the 1-level MIQP gives a range in which 
the global optimal objective value must lie. If the gap between 
them is small enough, the global solution can be well 
approximated by the solution of MPCC-NLP problem. 
 
C.   Binary Variables Reformulated Mathematical Program 
with Complementarity Constraints (MPCC-BIN) 
To   solve   the   problem   more   efficiently   and,   more 
importantly, to obtain a global optimal solution, we converted 
MPCC problem into an equivalent mixed integer quadratic 
program by introducing a set of binary variables σ  and 
the 
large parameters M [14]. For instance, the reformulation of 
equation (39) is: 
G1 and G2. The LSEs 4, 5 and 6 represent the electricity loads. 
The solid lines are the existing transmission lines and the 
dashed lines are the candidate transmission lines for possible 
expansion. 
The numerical results are based on a single hour. All of the 
expansion costs are also estimated on an hourly basis. The 
generation and transmission capital costs are derived from the 
Joint Coordinated System Plan report [25]. All of the other 
parameters in Table VI and VII are based on [2]. Tables IV, V, 
VI and VII give the parameters of the case study. 
 
TABLE IV 
INVESTMENT COSTS OF FUEL DELIVERY, GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION 
CAPACITY 
Investment Cost Coal Natural Gas 
fc ($/MWh) 1.5 4 
gc ($/MWh) 10 6 
tc ($/MWh) 4 
 
TABLE V 
FUEL CAPACITY AND TRANSPORTATION COST 
 
0 ≤  r ≤  M 
σ  
0 ≤  s ≤  M (1 −  σ  
) 
(40) 
(41) 
 
These inequalities ensure that either r or s must be zero. The 
complementarity constraints have been converted into the 
mixed integer linear constraints, and the whole problem 
becomes an MIQP problem. 
The constraints (22), (25) – (28), (36) and (38) of MPCC 
problem remain the same and the constraints (21), (23) – (24), 
(29) – (35) and (37) are reformulated by the binary variables. A 
large  number  of  binary  variables  are  introduced  in  the 
MPCC-BIN reformulation. 
 
IV.  NUMERICAL RESULTS 
We studied a six node transmission network with four fuel 
suppliers illustrated in Fig. 2 [2]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Integrated Electricity Supply Network including the Fuel Suppliers, 
Transmission Grid and Generators 
 
The generators P1, P2 and P3 are coal-fired plants, supplied 
by coal suppliers C1 and C2, and the generators P4 and P5 are 
natural gas-fired plants supplied by two natural gas suppliers 
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Transmission 
Line 
Transmission 
Capacity 
K i , j  (MW) 
Susceptance 
B   (Ω −1 ) ij 
 
z 0 ij 
(1, 3) 400 156.25 1 
(1, 4) 240 33.67 1 
(2, 3) 1000 ∞ 1 
(3, 4) 150 32.89 1 
(3, 6) 250 35.59 1 
(4, 5) 240 33.67 1 
(5, 6) 350 92.59 1 
(2, 6) 400 32.89 Can 
(2, 5) 400 35.59 Can 
(1, 6) 400 32.89 Can 
(1, 2) 400 156.25 Can 
(2, 4) 400 32.89 Can 
(4, 6) 400 33.67 Can 
 
 
TABLE VI 
GENERATION CAPACITY AND PARAMETERS FOR INVERSE DEMAND FUNCTION 
Electricity 
Nodes 
V j 
(MW) 
bj 
($/MWh/MWh) 
a j 
($/MWh) 
1 600 -∞ 0 
2 400 -∞ 0 
3 400 -∞ 0 
4 1000 -0.08 250 
5 600 -0.08 300 
6 N/A -0.08 350 
 
TABLE VII 
TRANSMISSION CAPACITY, SUSCEPTANCE OF THE NETWORK AND INITIAL 
STATUS OF THE TRANSMISSION LINES 
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Decision Variables 
Problems 
Original 
Equilibrium MPCC-NLP 
1-Level 
MIQP MPCC-BIN 
Objective Value 286191 559895 575362 564275 
Social Welfare 286191 598973 618312 600173 
Buyer Surplus 77798 242068 333332 243554 
Generator Surplus 119318 160840 52715 148060 
Transmission Rent 89075 196065 232265 208559 
Fuel Expan. Cost 0 12174 14598 12173 
Gen. Expan. Cost 0 17305 20353 15725 
Trans. Expan. Cost 0 9600 8000 8000 
 
 
Fuel 
Expansion 
(C1,1) 0 1018 755 755 
(C1,2) 0 18 67 125 
(C1,3) 0 131 360 312 
(G1,4) 0 722 860 713 
(G1,5) 0 1883 2346 1883 
Gen. 
Expansion 
1 0 628 365 365 
5 0 1353 1816 1353 
 
 
Trans. 
Expansion 
(2,6) 0 1 1 1 
(2,5) 0 1 1 1 
(1,6) 0 1 1 1 
(1,2) 0 1 0 0 
(2,4) 0 1 1 1 
(4,6) 0 1 1 1 
 
 
 
 
Fuel 
Delivered 
(C1,1) 200 1218 955 955 
(C1,2) 30 48 97 155 
(C1,3) 30 161 390 342 
(C2,1) 157 0 0 0 
(C2,2) 30 0 0 0 
(C2,3) 142 0 10 0 
(G1,4) 130 852 990 843 
(G1,5) 60 1943 2406 1943 
(G2,4) 790 0 10 0 
(G2,5) 540 0 10 0 
 
Amount 
generated by 
Generator 
1 357 1218 955 955 
2 60 48 97 155 
3 172 161 400 342 
4 920 852 1000 843 
5 600 1943 2416 1943 
 
Generation 
Consumed 
4 1256 1341 1501 1344 
5 386 1665 2138 1665 
6 468 1218 1229 1229 
 
 
Electricity 
Price 
1 90 97 73 90 
2 77 76 75 79 
3 77 76 75 79 
4 150 143 130 142 
5 269 167 129 167 
6 313 253 252 252 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electricity 
Flow 
(1,2) 0 344 0 0 
(1,3) 168 344 400 400 
(1,4) 190 228 240 240 
(1,6) 0 303 315 315 
(2,3) 60 -105 -400 -342 
(2,4) 0 150 150 150 
(2,5) 0 115 115 115 
(2,6) 0 231 231 231 
(3,4) 150 150 150 150 
(3,6) 250 250 250 250 
(4,5) 4 -44 -44 -44 
(4,6) 0 83 83 83 
(5,6) 218 350 350 350 
 
 
 
TABLE VIII 
NUMERICAL RESULTS OF ORIGINAL EQUILIBIRUM MPCC-NLP, 1-LEVEL MIQP 
AND MPCC-BIN PROBLEMS 
 
We implemented all the problem formulations: MPCC-NLP, 
1-level MIQP, and MPCC-BIN, via the modeling language of 
GAMS and called its inner solvers to solve the problems. The 
original equilibrium represents the solution to the lower level 
problem only and is found by the PATH solver [26]. The 
MPCC-NLP is solved by the DICOPT solver [27] which cannot 
guarantee global optimality. The 1-level MIQP and 
MPCC-BIN problems are both solved by the CPLEX solver 
[29] to global optimality. The numerical results are indicated in 
Table VIII. The “Original Equilibrium” solution in Table VIII 
gives the MPCC-NLP results without any expansion. The 
MPCC-BIN is solved with each value of M equal to 10000. The 
methodology to derive appropriate values for M is described in 
Appendix C. 
The BARON NLP solver could find a global optimum for 
MPCC-NLP if all mathematical expressions have finite lower 
and upper bounds [28]. We did not pursue this avenue because 
finding upper bounds is equivalent to identifying large enough 
values of M for the binary reformulation and finding lower 
bounds requires additional effort. 
Let   the   optimal   objective   values   found   by   solving 
MPCC-NLP, 1-level MIQP and MPCC-BIN be ζ 1  , ζ  2  
and 
ζ  3 , respectively,  and the global optimal value of the 
MIBLP 
problem  be ζ  opt   .  The  optimality  gap  of  the  MPCC-
NLP 
 
solution is ζ 1  −  
ζ  opt 
 
. Since the 1-level MIQP problem is a 
relaxation,  ζ  2 is  an  upper  bound  of ζ  opt   .  Therefore,  
the 
optimality gap is bounded by ζ 1  −  
ζ  2 
, which indicates how far 
the obtained optimal solution might be from the global optimal 
solution. The optimality gap by percentage can also be defined 
as ζ 1  −  ζ  opt / ζ  opt  
×100% 
, bounded from above by 
ζ 1  −  ζ  2   / ζ 1 ×100% . In our numerical study, the optimality 
gap 
ζ 1  −  ζ  2 is 15467 and the bound on the percentage optimality 
gap is 2.76%, which implies that the feasible solution solved by 
MPCC-NLP is within 2.76% of the global optimum. 
The MPCC-BIN reformulation is also equivalent to the 
MIBLP problem. Moreover, it is also a maximization problem 
with  a concave  quadratic  objective  function.  Therefore  the 
global optimal solution is guaranteed. The CPLEX solver 
verifies convexity by checking that the Hessian matrix of both 
objective function and the constraints is positive semi-definite. 
This allows inclusion of a lower bound, but not an upper bound, 
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constraint on the objective function value. We compared the 
computational time of the problem with and without the lower 
bound obtained from MPCC-NLP. The computation time in 
seconds for solving the original equilibrium, MPCC-NLP, and 
1-level MIQP are respectively 0.484 and 0.125.  It takes 0.953 
seconds to solve MPCC-BIN without any bound, and 0.64 
seconds with the lower bound provided by MPCC-NLP. That 
is, the bound improves the computational efficiency by nearly 
33%. 
The optimal solutions suggest that the decision maker should 
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build the candidate transmission lines (2, 6), (2, 5), (1, 6), (2, 4) 
and (4, 6) to achieve the global optimum. It is obvious in Table 
IV that the coal-fired generators are much cheaper than the 
natural gas-fired generators. Thus the electricity is more likely 
to flow from the left to right in Figure 2, especially given that 
all of the loads are located on nodes 4, 5 and 6. Before making 
the expansion decision, transmission congestion exists on lines 
(3,  4)  and  (3,  6).  Without  the  accessibility  of the  cheaper 
electricity, the LMPs on LSE nodes 4, 5 and 6 are much higher, 
which also suggests that more transmission lines are required to 
help deliver the electricity from left to right. The expansion 
made on the candidate transmission lines increases the 
transmission  capacity  to  deliver  more  electricity  from  the 
coal-fired generators to the loads, and thus will certainly help to 
balance the electricity prices of the network. 
As for the coal generators, the cheapest fuel source is C1. 
Therefore the decisions have been made to expand the arcs (C1, 
1), (C1, 2) and (C1, 3). Similar decisions have been made to 
expand the natural gas transportation from the relatively 
cheaper source G1. Even though the natural gas costs are about 
twice as high as the coal costs, the gas transport capacity is 
expanded because of the electricity transmission capacity 
limits. The grid congestion makes it impossible to use all of the 
electricity available from the coal-fired plants. 
The decision on the generation expansion matches the 
expansion on the fuel transportation and the transmission grid. 
The expansions help generate and deliver more cheap 
electricity to satisfy the demand and thus improve the balance 
in the electricity prices on the nodes. It also leads to an increase 
of sellers’ and buyers’ surplus. Although the price differences 
among the nodes has been decreased, the transmission 
congestion still exists and the increasing number of 
transmission lines results in even more transmission rents in 
total. All of the effects achieve an increase in overall welfare of 
the integrated electricity supply system. 
Also from Table VIII, by comparing the results of both 
MIQP and MPCC-BIN problems, we are able to see how the 
strategic decisions made by generation companies affect the 
performance of the electricity market,   due to the fact that 
MIQP problem is a relaxation of the MIBLP problem obtained 
by only eliminating the strategic behavior of the generators. 
Without generator strategic operational behavior, more fuel 
supply and generation facilities are expanded so that the 
electricity prices are lower, which results in a large increase in 
buyer surplus and decrease in generator surplus. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we investigated a capacity expansion bilevel 
programming problem. In the lower level, we take into account 
an integrated electricity supply system including the fuel 
transportation, generation and transmission, as well as the 
interactions among them in a restructured electricity market, 
where the buyer demand is modeled as a linear function of the 
electricity price. Capacity expansion decisions are made by an 
upper level decision maker from a global point of view. 
In the absence of strategic operational decisions by 
generators, the total social welfare increases. Electricity buyers 
are better off while the generators are worse off. Fuel and 
generation facilities are expanded more, which leads to lower 
electricity prices. In our numerical study, generator strategic 
operational decisions reduce the welfare less investment cost 
by 2%. 
We used two reformulations of the MPCC to efficiently 
identify a global optimum. The NLP reformulation takes less 
time to solve but its solution is not guaranteed to be globally 
optimal. It provides a feasible solution and lower bound on the 
optimal value. On the other hand, the binary formulation takes 
more time to solve, but it is able to identify the global optimal 
solution. Including the lower bound derived from MPCC-NLP 
significantly improves its computation time. However, it takes 
effort to find an appropriate M value as a tight bound for the 
mathematical expressions in the complementarity constraints to 
implement the MPCC-BIN reformulation. Small values of M 
could eliminate the optimal solution but excessively large ones 
increase the computation time. The relaxed 1-level MIQP 
provides upper bounds on the optimal value and optimality gap. 
It  can  be  solved  easily,  but will  not necessarily provide a 
feasible solution for the original problem. 
A six bus case study is provided to illustrate the three 
methodologies and give the combined expansion results in fuel 
transportation, generation and transmission. We also analyze 
the effect of the global optimal expansion decision on the 
integrated electricity supply system. 
For future research, the investment costs for the fuel 
transportation, generation and transmission subsystems can be 
further extended to nonlinear cost functions that incorporate 
economies of scale. A dynamic decision making process can 
also  be  represented  to  optimize  investment  decisions  in 
multiple periods over a long term horizon. The major 
uncertainties including natural gas cost and electricity demand 
can also be taken into account in the model. To do so, we can 
first generate different future scenarios for the uncertainties and 
then incorporate them into the model as a stochastic MPCC 
problem. Furthermore, we can also compare the results of the 
model in our paper with the ones from a more realistic point of 
view in which every asset owner makes his own capacity 
expansion decisions. This comparison will show how much the 
optimal decisions identified from a global point of view could 
benefit the integrated electricity supply system and provide 
possible targets for policy design. 
 
Appendix A 
Elaboration of Fuel Dispatcher’s Decision Problem 
 
Two fuel resources, coal and natural gas, which normally 
have different units $/ton and $/thousand cubic feet, are 
considered in Section IV. To make the units of different fuel 
types match and most importantly compatible with the unit of 
energy (MWh), we converted the units of fuel into MWh 
equivalents and set their cost parameters c, capacity limit 
parameters W and nU,  and investment costs fc accordingly. 
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H 
ε  
 
 
It  is  also  possible  to  directly  model  the  fuel  dispatcher 
problem with original units of fuel resources by incorporating 
the heat rate H and efficiency ε  conversion into the 
model. 
The fuel cost c can also further be decomposed into two parts: 
fuel cost cl and the delivery cost del. In this case, the objective 
then changed to: 
 
max 
yi ≥ 0,η  
 
 
(η  + φ i  −  π i ) yi  −  pco 2 ( Ei yi  −  Ni ) 
function Eq. (1) is changed to: If  the  carbon  emission  Eiyi   exceeds  its  allowance,  the 
generation company must buy allowances from others for the 
extra emissions. Otherwise, the generation company can make  
max ⎛ 1 b q 2  + a q  ⎞ −
 
(cl
 
+ del  ) x
  
a profit by selling its unused allowances. In addition, a market 
nU , nV , z , q 
∑ ⎜ 2  j     j j     j ⎜       
∑  
gj gj gj 
j   ⎝ ⎠ gj∈ A clearing equilibrium constraint must be added to the upper level 
−  ∑  fcgj  (nU gj  −  U gj ) −  ∑  gc j (nV j  − V 
j ) 
gj∈ A j∈ N 
−  ∑ tcij Kij zij 
optimization problem [30]: 
 
⎛ ⎞ 
ij∈ L 0 ≤  pco 2  ⊥  ⎜ ∑  Ei yi  −  ∑  Ni ⎜ ≤  
0 
(42) 
 
 
And the fuel dispatcher’s decision problem is revised as: 
⎝    i i ⎠ 
 
min 
x ≥ 0 
∑  (clgj  + delgj ) xgj 
gj∈ A 
If the total carbon emission is less than the total amount of 
the allowance, the carbon allowance trade is free. Otherwise, 
there  is  price  pco2>0  for  buying  each  ton  of  the  carbon s.t.  −  ∑  xgj  ≥  −Wg 
, 
j∈ N g 
∀g ∈  F [ω g  ≥  0] allowance. 
y ε  
x  e   =    j    j , 
 
∀j ∈  N
 
[π  ]
  Appendix C
 
∑  g∈ F j gj   g j 
j 
Setting the Values for M in the Binary Reformulation 
−  xgj  ≥  − nU gj 
, 
∀gj ∈  A 
xgj  ≥  0 
[ρ gj  ≥  
0] 
 
One way to set the M value is to roughly estimate the 
biggest possible values for all the r and s in the equilibrium 
constraints,  which  is  equivalent  to  estimating  the  upper 
Since  the  units  of  x  are  $/ton  and  $/thousand  cubic  feet 
respectively, we have parameter e (BTU/ton or BTU/thousand 
cubic feet) to convert both of them into $/BTU. 
The revision affects the units of π, which also represent the 
marginal costs in the objective function of generator’s problem. 
It can be expressed as: 
bounds of the dual and primal variables. 
For the fuel dispatcher’s decision problem, Eq (21), (23) 
and (24) are the relevant equilibrium constraints. The primal 
variables x are bounded by nU, the new fuel transportation 
capacities after expansion. The expansion will not be infinite 
due to the limited electricity demand. The dual variables ω, π 
and ρ represent how much the objective function changes if 
 
max
 ⎛ H ⎞ 
η  + φ  −  j  π  y 
the right-hand side (RHS) changes by 1 unit. For Eq. (3) and 
⎜ i i ⎜     i 
yi ≥ 0,η  ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ j ⎠ 
 
Appendix B 
Incorporation of Carbon Emission Regulations 
 
One of the ways to consider carbon emission concerns is 
simply to adopt a carbon emission cost pco2 with the unit $/ton. 
The objective function of the generator’s  problem is restated 
as: 
(5), the largest possible change in objective function happens 
when an extra unit of the cheapest fuel resource becomes 
available and substitutes one unit of the most expensive fuel 
resource, which is estimated as cgj  −  cgj   = 60 in this specific 
instance.  Likewise,  we  can  also  obtain  the  upper  bound 
cgj  =125 for π which represents the marginal fuel cost. 
For the generator’s decision problem, we estimated the 
bound  of  the  variables  in the same manner so that y is 
bounded  by  nV,  and  µg   and  βj   are  both  bounded  by 
a j  −  π  j  =285. max yi ≥ 0,η  
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(η  + φ i  −  π i ) yi  −  
pco 2 Ei yi 
 
For ISO’s decision 
problem with 
equilibrium 
constraints 
(29) – (34), f, θ and 
q are bounded by K, 
θmax  and nV, 
The parameter E is the tons of carbon emitted per MWh of 
energy produced depending on different generation 
technologies. 
Another way to incorporate the carbon emission is in a 
cap-and-trade system. Each of the generation companies is 
given a certain number of carbon emission allowances N. 
Generation companies are allowed to trade the allowances as 
long as the total carbon emissions of the system are within the 
limit [30]. The objective function of the generator’s problem is 
respectively. The upper bound for p is a, the intercepts of the 
inverse demand functions. The dual variables of the voltage 
angle constraints, α+  and α-, will not affect the objective 
function because the voltages are always within the bounds. 
The dual variables λ+ and λ- indicate how much the welfare 
changes if the capacity limit changes by one unit. Since it is 
quite difficult to estimate the impact of a one unit flow 
change on q, we can roughly evaluate the largest possible 
change in q and the welfare accordingly. Likewise, we obtain 
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the bounds for γ+ and γ-. 
According to the rough estimating result of the bounds, 
letting each value of M be 10,000 will be large enough. 
Another way to give the M an appropriate guess is to take 
advantage of the MPCC-NLP solution. It provides a general 
idea  of  neighborhoods  for  the  optimal  values  of  the 
variables, which can be used to estimate a tighter and more 
realistic M. Based on our MPCC-NLP solution, we estimate 
that 5000 should be large enough for M. 
In our case study of MPCC-BIN, we tried out different 
values for M, ranging from 2000 to 100000. The results 
indicate that all of these values are valid for M because they 
all result in the same optimal solution. Better computational 
performance could be achieved by setting different M values 
for each of the mathematical expressions in the 
complementarity constraints. 
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